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Can it be that in its decisions upon issues of civil rights the Supreme
Court has been less moved by a consideration of those rights alone than
by the accidental presence of a property right? It would seem that the
latter has definitely been a qualifying factor, and consequently that the
protection accorded to individual civil rights has been materially more
widespread where these rights have been allied in interest with substantial
property rights than where they have not.
For the fifty years which followed The Slaughterhouse Cases,1 the
Supreme Court was alert to strike down state interferences with indi-
vidual property rights as in violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus the state was held without power to
deny the right of an employer to discriminate against a worker for
union activities,2 to interfere with the right of a man to conduct a
private business,' or with the freedom of contract.4 Yet all this time
not a single civil right, save only the right to move from state to state,5
was given a similar protection. This state of affairs so disturbed Mr.
Justice Brandeis that it moved him to declare in his dissent to Gilbert v.
Minnesota' that it was impossible of belief "that the liberty guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment includes only liberty to acquire and to
enjoy property". Indeed Mr. Justice Brandeis, along with Mr. Justice
Harlan,' would protect the freedom of speech as a privilege and im-
munity of a citizen of the United States, thus flying in the face of a
contrary doctrine settled by the court since The Slaughterhouse Cases.'
The great war and its accompanying hysteria brought forth the
Espionage Act.' This raised the question of how far Congress might
go in limiting the fundamental liberty of free speech. The court's first
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pronouncement came in Schenck v. United States"0 where the test, since
styled the "Holmes test" was made "whether the words are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a dear and present
danger * * 4 of the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
It is a question of proximity and degree." This test immediately became
the subject of much adverse criticism and seven days later the court
affirmed the judgment of a conviction returned under a jury charge
which required only that the acts have a "dangerous tendency"."1 In
this form it was reaffirmed in .Abrams v. United States,"2 Schaefer v.
United States," and Pierce v. United States,'4 but these were cases
arising under a statute prohibiting certain enumerated acts and utter-
ances, whereas the Schenck case was decided'under a statute "general
in the description of the mischief to be remedied". Consequently the
argument has been made that the Holmes test was not intended to be
applied to the latter type of legislation.
The various state criminal syndicalist acts which have given rise to
most of the recent civil rights litigation were drafted after the general
model of the federal statute involved in the Abrams and Pierce cases.'"
They presuppose that under all circumstances the state has inherent
power to suppress the advocacy of its own overthrow even though such
advocacy, if unrestrained, will not necessarily result in the evil sought
to be avoided. Standing foremost among such cases, and following
quite naturally in the wake of the Abrams, Schaefer, and Pierce cases' 6
is the Supreme Court decision in Gitlow v. New York.' There the
court held that what constitutes a substantive evil may be defined by
the state legislature, and that if such legislation be reasonably connected
with the general welfare, its finding will not be open to question even
though the danger from the specific act for which the party is accused
is distant and remote. Thus the implied legislative finding of general
danger in that case removed the necessity for proof of danger in the
individual act in controversy.
The court stepped down from this position in Fiske v. Kansas" to
the extent of requiring that such statutes be not arbitrarily applied. In
Whitney v. Californiai" Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion,
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urged that it be further retreated from to the end that the legislative
declaration be considered as no more than presumptive evidence of the
fact that the specified conduct does really constitute a serious evil. He
further contended, that unless such evil be of such a nature that it
will probably result in imminent and serious injury, the suppression
of free speech is both unjustified and unconstitutional. This was an
adoption of the Holmes view and an application of it to a statute pro-
hibiting certain specific acts and utterances as obnoxious and as adding
to the potential injury already present in a general situation of danger.
In its construction of statutes prohibiting specific acts the court has
steadfastly refused to go to this point, but last year in Herndon v.
Lowry20 it did reaffirm the Holmes test and apply it to a state statute
which described in general terms this evil sought to be remedied.
Unfavorable, perhaps, to free speech in its immediate holding, the
Gitlow case really opened up new vistas for those civil rights which are
embodied in the first eight amendments to the federal constitution by
its dictum that free speech and press, being fundamental rights and
liberties, are protected from state impairment by the word "liberty" in
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At last the court
had announced itself possessed of the jurisdiction to review cases where
the state had overstepped its bounds in the exercise of its police power,
to the detriment of man's fundamental personal liberties. Affirmed in
the Whitney case this jurisdiction was first exercised to overturn a state
statute in the "red flag" case21 where the court held a state prohibition
against wholly peaceful opposition to organized government to be a
violation of the individual liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Brought under federal protection along with freedom of speech by
the dictum in the Gitlow case, freedom of the press was accorded a posi-
tion of even greater security by Near v. Minnesota.22 Handed down a
scant two weeks after the rather narrow decision in the Stromberg case,23
this opinion, written by Mr. Justice Hughes, took up where the latter
case left off and proceeded to carry the torch for liberty at a much
faster gait. In contrast to all the earlier discussions of personal liberty,
this opinion has a broad and confident tone and gives sweeping protection
to the liberty at issue. Specifically, the case holds that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the states to impose prior
restraints upon publication. A distinction exists between the issue pre-
"" 30! U.S. 242, Si L. Ed. xo66, 57 Sup. CL 732 ('937).
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sented by this case and the speech cases, however. In the latter the court
has to deal with an utterance made and completed. There the freedom
has already been exercised, whereas here the question is whether or
not the publication may be suppressed before it can gain a hearing.
Thus the necessary effect of the decision is that the state cannot prevent
the abuse of the freedom of the press although it is not denied the power
to punish it after its commission.
Five years later, by declaring invalid as in violation of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a state tax levied solely upon the
newspaper and periodical industry, the court gave further protection to
this freedom. 4 Looking through the announced purpose of the act,
the court found the Huey Long machine at work, and again laid the
ghost of state censorship, represented here by a tax, in another opinion
both broad and bold. Here too there was no attempt to narrow the
discussion to the precise points of the decision. Indeed a dictum in the
case is capable of the interpretation that all the rights protected by the
first eight amendments against federal encroachment are likewise safe-
guarded from state invasion by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This sweeping opinion was written by Mr. Justice Suth-
erland.
In the interval between the two press cases indications of a more
liberal trend were not wanting elsewhere and additional civil rights
were brought within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus in 1932 it was held that the failure of a state court to appoint
counsel for an accused was a denial of due process since the circum-
stances showed such appointment to be "essential to the substance of a
hearing". 2 In 1934 religious freedom also entered the protective fold
of due process by way of dictum,20 and the following year saw the con-
viction of a Scottsboro defendant reversed because the systematic exclu-
sion of Negroes from the juries amounted to a denial of his constitutional
right to the equal protection of the laws."
In keeping with this tendency it was fitting that the right peaceably
to assemble be accorded protection similar to that given speech and the
press. Opportunity was presented early in 1937 by the case of Delonge
v. Oregon"8 and the court, speaking unanimously through Mr. Justice
24 Groseawt v. Amer. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, So L. Ed. 66o, 56 Sup. Ct. 444 (1936).
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Hughes, responded with a strong opinion bringing this right also within
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, saying that "con-
sistently with the federal constitution, peaceable assembly for lawful
discussion cannot be made a crime,"29 thereby overruling on this point
a dictum in the case of Presser v. Illinois.3" The actual holding of the
DeJonge case was that participation in a meeting otherwise lawful can-
not be made criminal merely because of the auspices under which the
assembly was convoked. One indirect effect of it may possibly be the
exclusion as irrelevant of the typical evidence of communistic tenets
inevitably offered against an admitted member of that party in order
to appeal to the prejudice of the jury.
Mention should also be made of the recent decision in Zssociated
Press v. National Labor Relations Board." Holding that the news-
paper business has no special immunity ipso facto from the application
of general laws, the court here upheld the provision in the National
Labor Relations Act32 making it an unfair labor practice to discharge an
employee for union activities. The employer contended that this restric-
tion on the right of discharge tended to imperil its freedom of speech and
press in that the editorial policies could not be given satisfactory expres-
sion if their execution were entrusted to writers tainted with a bias
opposed to the views of the publisher. Turning to the statute, the court
belittled this argument by pointing out that the employment relation
might be terminated for "any cause" seeming proper to the employer
save only that proscribed by the act, and that "any cause" would in-
dubitably include any trace of prejudice attaching to the writer from his
association with the union or its activities. It would seem that the court
took a well considered, common sense view of this situation. Microscopic
infringements of even the greatest of liberties may well be beneath the
notice of the court. Especially is this true when society must otherwise
pay for their protection with the sacrifice of projects far more important
to it than prevention of the slight injury to the right sought to be pro-
tected.
Last of the current chapters is Herndon v. Lowry." There, in
dusting off the old clear and present danger test and applying it for the
first time to a state sedition act3", the court adverted favorably to the
Gitlow case, reapproving it as applied to a specifically defined class of
_"The Oregon statutes here involved, Oregon Code I935 Supp. See. 14-3110 to 14-
3112z, were later repealed5 Oregon Laws, 1937, c. 362.I.r I6 U.S. 252, 29 L. Ed. 615, 6 Sup. Ct. 5So (x868).
o' 301 U.S. 103, Si L. Ed. 953, 57 Sup. Ct. 65o (1937).
29 U.S.C.A. 157 (I93S).
2 Supra, note 20.
3' Georgia Penal Code. Chap. 56.
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utterances or conduct subject, however, to the qualification that such
enactments must find "justification in a reasonable apprehension of
danger to organized government. * * * The limitation upon individual
liberty must have appropriate relation to the safety of the state." This
would seem to have the effect of adopting the Brandeis view that the
legislative finding of danger in the act prohibited should be no more
than presumptive evidence of that fact.
There nevertheless remain in this field of the law several important
hiatus. Unanswered are such questions as: What constitutes a peaceable
assembly? When does the use of a constitutional privilege become an
abuse? At what point is the standard to be fixed for purposes of the
dear and present danger test? How remote may such danger be? And
what shall constitute a sufficient degree of evil? The last three questions
bring out distinctly the objection to the Holmes test as one which is too
purely subjective.
Conceivably, the Gitlow case is itself an application of it. The legis-
lature there deemed an act having a dangerous tendency to be a threat
to the future peace and welfare of the state. Should the court now
substitute its judgment for that of the people's duly elected representa-
tives in ascertaining what acts do constitute a substantive danger? Lib-
erals have vigorously condemned the Gitlow decision but its immediate
effect was merely to bow to the legislative finding of a fact better de-
terminable by the law makers than by the courts.
Also unanswered is the question of whether mere membership in a
seditious organization is punishable. The Stromberg case3" seems to
suggest that it is so, yet it would seem that this is no more than a passive
expression of belief. In this connection civil rights exponents have hailed
Butash v. State," a recent Indiana decision, as a step in the right direc-
tion, but a comparison of this opinion with that written in the famous
Gitlow case fails to bring out any substantial advance whatever."
An answer to some, if not all of these questions may be found in the
traditional process of exclusion and inclusion characterizing all other
questions arising under the due process clause. Here the question of its
proper limitation presents a conflict between the protection of the indi-
vidual civil right and the police power of the state.
A critical analysis of this long line of cases involving state invasion
of civil rights reveals dearly the probable underlying sympathies of the
Supreme Court. The more purely personal liberties have received from
the court a much more extensive recognition when aligned with sub-
stantial property rights than when presented alone. In the latter situa-
'S upra, note 21.
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37 See z68 U.S. 664, 66S.
tion the court has tended to crystallize the existing law in its application
to them, whereas their appearance in conjunction with property rights
has been the signal for the expression of much solicitude by the court for
rights both personal and propertied.
Thus in 'lllegeyer v. Louisiana" the court, in finding the freedom of
contract to be within the protection of the word "liberty" in the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, said that liberty means
"cnot merely the right of a citizen to be free from the mere physical
restraint of his person,3" but * * * is deemed to embrace the right of a
citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties".
Again, where the civil right, freedom of the press, involved also
those substantial property rights incident to the millions of dollars in-
vested in the newspaper business, the court brought that freedom within
the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
in two very broad opinions, defending it against both the state police
power"' and taxation power. 4 In each case the court went far out of
its way to demonstrate why this liberty should be protected.
Yet even within the newspaper field the court has viewed the issue
quite narrowly in the two cases where the question presented related
to the subject matter printable in the news columns rather than to the
nature of the right to engage in the business itself.4" Technically, per-
haps, the court was sound in each holding.43 The criticism is directed
at the spirit in which the cases appear to have been decided. In other
cases where no substantial property interest has been aligned with the civil
rights the court has refused to generalize upon the protection to be
given them, and has sometimes restricted its decisions to a surprising
degree.44 The Delonge case appears in striking contrast to this general
tendency.
" Supra, note 4.
35 For an extended discussion of the evolution of the word "liberty" and the "due
process clause" of the 14 th Amendment see Charles Warren "The New Liberty" 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 431 (89z6).
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38 Sup. Ct. 56o (19x8).
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punish for contempt a newspaper and its editor when the criticism published had a ten-
dency to impair the administration of justice. Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent to this
decision contended that the publication should first obstruct justice in a particular case
before it should be so punishable, saying that a mere impairment of general prestige
should not be sufficient.
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Fiske v. Kansas, supra, note iS. Compare Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 71 L. Ed.
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Furthermore, where no accompanying property right existed pro-
tection has often been denied to the civil right. Thus the state was held
to have power to change the manner of preliminary criminal proceed-
ings from indictment to information,4 to reduce the number of jurors
from twelve to eight in a criminal case,46 to abrogate the right against
double jeopardy,47 the right against self-incrimination,4" and to levy a
tax on the right to vote.4"
In one other situation the court has been favorable to those more
purely civil rights. This is in a small line of decisions, which might be
called the "consolation cases," denying protection to the particular right
in issue but favorable, in dicta, to civil rights in general. Thus in Twin-
ing v. New Jersey"0 the court proclaimed that some of the rights pro-
tected by the first eight amendments might also be safeguarded from
state action because their denials would be a denial of due process; in
Palk& v. Connecticut,1 after a holding along the same general lines,
the court made the statement that "the domain of liberty, withdrawn
by the Fourteenth Amendment from incroachment by the states, has
been enlarged to include liberty of mind as well as action"; and in
Gitlow v. New York a dictum brought freedom of speech and press
under federal protection. The role played by the court in such cases is
not unlike that of the stern taskmaster occasionally made more sympa-
thetic by twinges of remorse.
The thesis advanced could not be supported by any one of these
cases, or by any given group of them, but viewed as a whole the decisions
are persuasive of the conclusion that the court has been unduly influenced
by the presence or absence of an accompanying property right in
determining the degree of protection to be granted civil rights.
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